

## 05. Linguistic analysis of impairment data.

### 05.02. Enunciative analysis of impaired speech samples: enunciation and utterance, enunciation and reception.

#### Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts.

#### Inferences: conversational presupposition and implication.

### Act of utterance and the utterance, act of utterance and reception



One of the fundamental concepts of pragmatics is that of **UTTERANCE**, in contrast to two others: the uttered and reception.

This leads directly to the theory of Utterance formulated by [Emile Benveniste](#). This theory states that every text bears formal traces of its author (speaker/writer) and also of its addressee (listener/reader); thus speaker and listener become **INTERNAL FUNCTIONS** in the text, independently of the real people who created it (spoken or written). In other words, we can say that texts speak about their authors/receivers, they contain them, and we can therefore analyse each fragment of the data by searching for the formal traces they leave in it<sup>1</sup>. In his article "The formal apparatus of enunciation"<sup>2</sup>, included in *Problems in General Linguistics*<sup>3</sup>, Benveniste argued:

*"As individual production, utterance can be defined, in relation to language, as a process of 'appropriation'. The speaker appropriates the formal apparatus of language and utters their position as speaker by means of specific signs, on the one hand, and by using secondary procedures, on the other.*

*"But immediately, as soon as they state their role of speaker and take on the language, they introduce the 'other' in front of them, no matter what degree of presence is attributed to that other person. Any utterance, whether explicit or implicit, is a speech act, it nominates a receiver. (...) The individual act of appropriation of language places the speaker in their own speech. This is a constituent fact of utterance. The presence of the speaker in their utterance means that each instance of discourse constitutes an internal point of reference". (Benveniste 1970: 84-85).*

The utterance is thus conceived as the "intermediate instance" between *language* (in the Saussurean sense) as a system of signs, and *speech* (in the same sense) as an express manifestation of language. The act of utterance/uttered cognate refers to the distinction between the communicative situation in which speech is produced and its result. Thus, the utterance is also defined as the act of "putting the language to work by an individual act of use. [...] It is the act itself of producing an utterance" (Benveniste 1970: 83).

<sup>1</sup> Roland Barthes comments on the theoretical implications that the theory of utterance can have for literary theory: "...linguistics has just provided the death of the author with a precious analytical tool, by showing that the complete utterance is an empty process that functions perfectly without the need for filling it with its individual interlocutors: linguistically speaking, the author is never anything more than he or she who writes, in the same way as the self is none other than the person who says I; language knows a 'subject', not a 'person', and that subject, empty except in the utterance itself, which is what defines it, is sufficient to keep language 'on its feet', that is, to completely exhaust it". (1984: *El susurro del lenguaje. Más allá de la palabra y la escritura (The whisper of language. Beyond words and writing)*, Barcelona: Paidós, 1987. Trans. by C.Fernández Medrano; pag. 68).

Julia Kristeva's work on the dynamic concept of subjectivity is also based on Benveniste's ideas (Kristeva, Julia (1986): "The system of the speaking subject", en T. Moi (ed): *The Kristeva Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 34-61).

<sup>2</sup> Benveniste, Émile (1970): "El aparato formal de la enunciación", en *Problemas de lingüística general, II*, México: Siglo XXI, 1977; 82- 91. Trans. by Juan Almela.

<sup>3</sup> Benveniste, E. (1977): *Problemas de lingüística general II*, México: Siglo XXI, pp. 82- 91.

The formal traces that an author-speaker leaves in their text-speech can be:

- Permanent: the marks of a person, time and space<sup>4</sup>; personal pronouns are particularly interesting, as they do not refer to a concept or to an individual and can only be identified with instances of speech.
- Variables: supra-segmental features, speech modes, certain adverbs, etc.

In the article "Of subjectivity in language" (1958)<sup>5</sup>, in addition to permanent resources (person, time and place), Benveniste also argued the special role of the *VERBA DICENDI*, which, in addition to describing or referencing a process of reality (as when they are used in the third person), can, in the 1st person, create the act itself; they are in themselves the swearing, the promise, the certification, etc.

The act of utterance/reception cognate leads to a consideration of verbal behaviour from its inherently dialogic nature. In "Of subjectivity in language", Benveniste described what can be termed (Hernández Sacristán 1984) the constitutive interdependence of utterance and reception:

*"It is in and by language that man is constituted as subject; because the sole language rests the concept of 'ego' in reality, in his reality which is that of being.*

*"The 'subjectivity' being discussed here is the speaker's ability to see themselves as 'subject' (...) it is no more than the emergence in the self of a fundamental property of language. 'Ego' is he or she who says 'ego'. Here we find the foundation of 'subjectivity', determined by the linguistic status of the 'person'.*

*"Conscience of oneself is not possible other than if it is experienced by contrast. I do not use I unless I am addressing someone, who, in my allocution, is you. This condition of dialogue is what is constitutive of the person, as it implies by reciprocity that I become you in the allocution of the person who is now I. Here we see a principle whose consequences must spread out in all directions. Language is not possible unless each speaker becomes subject and refers to themselves as I in their discourse". (180-181).*

## Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts.



The basic unit of enunciative pragmatics is the speech act, identified by John Austin (1911-1960) in a series of conferences given in 1955 and published posthumously in 1962 under the title *How to do things with words*. Austin (1962:101)<sup>6</sup> identifies three types of simultaneous actions in every utterance:

- the illocutionary act: the action performed when making the utterance; the force of the utterance,
- the locutionary act: performing the utterance; consists of (Austin, 1962: 95) phonetic act -uttering certain sounds-, phatic act -in accordance with a grammatical structure-, and rhetic act -making certain sounds-; associated with the meaning, and
- the perlocutionary act: repercussions in the receiver; effects.

<sup>4</sup> Kerbrat-Orecchioni defines deictics as "linguistic units whose semantic and referential function (selection in coding, interpreting in decoding) implies taking into consideration some of the constitutive elements of the communication situation, that is, the role played by the actors of the utterance in the utterance process, the speaker's space-time situation and, eventually, that of the receiver". (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Catherine (1980): *La enunciación. De la subjetividad en el lenguaje*, Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1986. Traducción de Gladys Anfora y Emma Gregores; pág. 48).

<sup>5</sup> Benveniste, Émile (1958): "De la subjetividad en el lenguaje", en *Problemas de lingüística general, I*, México: Siglo XXI, 1974; 179-187. Trans. by Juan Almela.

<sup>6</sup> Austin, John (1962): *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford: University Press.

Of these, the first has become a focus of interest for pragmatics. According to Levinson's definition (1983: 227)<sup>7</sup> the illocutionary act "is what is directly achieved by the conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in accord with a conventional procedure". This force is the ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE of the utterance: "the recognition of the speaker's purpose in uttering that X" (McLaughlin 1984:63)<sup>8</sup>.

The typology of illocutionary acts put forward by Austin (1962: 148 ss) recognises:

- VERDICTIVES: give a verdict.
- EXERCITIVES: exercising powers, rights or influence.
- COMMISSIVES: commit the speaker to something, whether to a future action (promise) or a to statement.
- BEHABITIVES: a heterogeneous group related to attitudes and social behaviour.
- EXPOSITIVES: refer to the speaker's position in the course of a discussion or conversation: *answer, argue, concede, accept, admit, etc.*

As you can see, since Austin the various types of speech act have been linked with different verbs, which has sometimes led to methodological confusion. It should be remembered that Austin's starting point was the identification of two types of utterance:

- constative, which are true or false (*llueve - it is raining*),
- and performative, or executive, that just by being spoken involve an action added to the speech act, and that are not susceptible to being declared true or false. Utterances such as *Te declaro la guerra (I declare war on you)*, *Te juro que no he sido yo (I swear that it was not me)*, or *Te prometo que lo haré (I promise that I will do it)*. Later studies have come to the conclusion that every sentence involves an act of this kind, although it may be implicit: "*Te digo que*" (*I tell you that*), "*supongo que*" (*I suppose that*), "*pregunto si*" (*I ask if*), etc. The type of verb that utters the illocutionary action has been called PERFORMATIVE VERB (for Austin, Explicit Performative, as opposed to the Primary Performative, 1962: 83), but it should not be confused with a type of act.

Austin endows performative utterances with four features:

- they correspond grammatically to a declarative sentence
- they are in 1st person indicative
- they are not meaningless expressions
- they are neither true nor false, but rather adequate or inadequate.

<sup>7</sup> Levinson, Stephen (1983): *La Pragmática (Pragmatics)*. Barcelona: Teide, 1987. Trans. by África Rubiés.

<sup>8</sup> McLaughlin, Margaret (1984): *Conversation: how talk is organized*, Beverly Hills: Sage Pub.

By Michael Stubbs (1987): *Análisis del discurso (Discourse analysis)*, Madrid, Alianza, p. 153 ss

"The basic idea, developed by J. L. Austin in 1955 in his Harvard University classes, is that words are actions. Certain actions can only be carried out through language (apologising, for example) and others can be performed verbally and non-verbally (threaten, for example). Moreover, as soon as we begin to study how language is used in social interaction, it becomes evident that communication is impossible if the speaker and the listener do not share certain knowledge and assumptions.

(...) Austin's original idea was that to state or describe is only one of language's functions. He argued that statements (constatives, in Austin's terms) do not even have a privileged position. Although they are usually thought to be basic, adults do not generally make unsolicited statements or describe the world. The basic distinction between constatives and performatives is that only the former can be true or false. Performatives are used to perform actions, so there is no sense in questioning their truthfulness. For example, if A says: *I*

*promise to come*, it makes no sense for B to say: *That isn't true*.

(...) Austin's original distinction between constative and performative is erroneous, as Austin himself recognised, because the same statement can be affirmed, negated or asked, be a reminder to someone else, used as a complaint, etc. That is, the statement is a speech act like any other.

(...) From this observation, Austin developed his general theory of speech acts. Utterances can carry out three types of act. The locutionary act is the act of saying something, of producing a series of sounds that have meaning. This is the aspect of language that linguistics has traditionally been interested in. The perlocutionary act produces an effect in listeners. Persuasion is a perlocutionary act: you cannot persuade someone of something by simply saying *I persuade you*. Similar examples would be convince, disturb, frighten and entertain. The effect of language on the audience has traditionally been the field of rhetoric. The illocutionary act is carried out when something is said, for example: bet, promise, deny and order. Some verbs used to define illocutionary acts can be used performatively. For example, to say *I deny X* is to deny it.

[John Searle](#)<sup>9</sup> expands the number of simultaneous acts in an utterance to four, distinguishing alongside the locutionary act (utterance: enunciative act) a propositional act that consists of expressing a certain reference or predication. Thus, we have the joint performance of acts that are:

- illocutionary
- enunciative
- propositional and
- perlocutionary.

John Searle



But the focus of interest is still the illocutionary act, for which he proposes the following classification:

- REPRESENTATIVE: they commit the speaker with the truth of the proposition expressed (1976:10), so that "*all of the members of the representative class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes "true" and "false"*". The performative verbs corresponding to this illocutionary act are those referred to in ASSERTIVES: *affirm, conclude, deduce*
- DIRECTIVES: attempt to intervene in the listener's behaviour. They can be "modest" attempts (such as *invite* or *suggest*) or more decisive attempts (*insist*). The propositional content is always that the listener carries out a particular future action: *request, ask, order, invite, challenge, permit, warn, notify, advise, recommend*.
- COMMISSIVES: commit the speaker to performing a future act. The condition for sincerity is intention, and the propositional content always refers to a particular future action by the speaker: PROMISES, THREATS, BETS: *promise, threaten, offer*.
- EXPRESSIVES: express a psychological state which is specified in the condition of sincerity: THANKS, CONGRATULATIONS: *thank, apologise, congratulate*.
- DECLARATIVES: provoke immediate changes in the institutional situation and tend to depend on extralinguistic institutions. The performance supposes that a particular speaker establishes a correspondence between the propositional content and reality, that is to say, the world. There are no superficial distinctions between the propositional content and the illocutionary force: *excommunicate, declare war, baptise*.

Searle's proposal is particularly interesting in the clinical field, insofar as the internal dimensions of illocutionary acts (enunciative dimension, "say words", and propositional dimension, "mean realities") can appear disjointed in impairment situations; in fact, the differentiation between ENUNCIATIVE act and PROPOSITIONAL act enables the specific characterisation of types of aphasia: whilst in the typical speaker with sensory aphasia, utterance seems to be easy and fluent, the speaker with Broca's aphasia has serious difficulties in uttering chains of meaning, that is, to perform locutionary acts.

However, once lexical and articulatory access has been achieved, the association between the locutionary speech act and the propositional act does not appear to be a problem in Broca's aphasia, whilst in sensory aphasia, both dimensions clearly appear to be dissociated and anosognosia can lead the speaker to chain incoherently without realising it. In sensory aphasia, owing to the semantic component being affected, the ability to associate the illocutionary and propositional dimensions of the speech act can be lost.

<sup>9</sup> Searle, John (1976): "A classification of illocutionary acts", *Language in Society*, 5.

Main element	Dimension of the speech act	Value	Linguistic component
Speaker	ILLOCUTIONARY Illocutionary act	Having certain communicative intention ("illocutional force")	Pragmatics
Message	LOCUTIONARY Enunciative act  Propositional act	Making sounds of the language  Organising these sounds into a chain of meaning	Phonology  Lexical  Semantic Morphosyntax
Receiver	PERLOCUTIONARY Perlocutionary act	Effect achieved in the receiver	

When we analyse data from speakers with motor aphasia, characterised by anomie and articulatory failure, we can see, however, that enunciative acts, deprived of propositional content, fulfil an essential dialogic function. In these cases, we refer to *speech acts activating inferences*, as they enable the speaker to state their proposals of interpretation.

Type of act	Searle's definition	Examples
Representative	The act refers to a certain state of things	assertions, affirmations, beliefs
Directive	The act provokes certain behaviour in the listener	questions, suggestions, invitations, calls, requests
Expressive	The act expresses a psychological state	congratulations, thanks, condolences
Commissive	The speaker commits to performing a future act	dares, bets, oaths, promises, challenges
Declarative	The utterance of a particular enunciation in certain social and cultural conditions provokes certain consequences in that context	baptisms, declarations of war, inaugurations, signing contracts

As regards the effective performance of ILLOCUTIONARY SPEECH ACTS, we find that it is possible for speakers with aphasia. The difficulties, as we have pointed out above, affect the locutionary and propositional dimension, in which grammar is involved (Gallardo 2005). If we accept the classic classification proposed by J. Searle (1976), we see that the PerLA corpus provides cases of all kinds of performance except for the declarative act, which is of necessity linked to different social and communicative contexts to those of the recordings (although the informed consent that many of our subjects have been able to sign in fact shows these declarative features).

These speech acts, which Searle groups according to their illocutional force, can also be classified according to the place they typically occupy within the intervention, as we should not lose sight of the fact that they are always used effectively in interactive, dialogic contexts. This is why, in our view, it is important to consider two basic types of speech act according to their relevance in the turn taking system:

- dynamic or linking acts, that are effectively used to regulate turn taking; they can be retro-active or projective, according to their occurrence they refer to either the previous or the next turn.
- static or constitutive acts: limited to development of the topic whilst maintaining the turn pattern.

In addition, there are some linguistic elements that seem to specialise in producing dynamic speech acts:

- Retro-active linking turns: *prefaces* (marking the relation with the previous intervention: markers, prefaces, erroneous position markers, disjunctive markers, contrast markers) and *restarts* (when the speaker interrupts themselves at the beginning of the turn, used for getting attention).
- Projective linking turns: signal the end of the intervention and turn handover: they are basically *tag questions* (“¿no?”, “¿eh?”, “¿sabes?”) and *extension phrases* (“y eso”, “y nada”).

Speakers with motor aphasia tend to over-exploit some of these structures, in order to check they are being understood by their conversational partner, and this enables them to keep their turn despite their possible slowness/difficulty.

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Together with the typology of speech acts according to their illocutional force and their place in the intervention, there is a third classification that is relevant to clinical pragmatics, dealing with the conversational level at which the speech act is situated. We can thus differentiate between:

- substantive acts (that are themselves the utterance or message) and
- control or metacommunicative acts (that refer to aspects of the utterance).

When verbal activity itself becomes the object of a communicative act, as occurs in language therapy sessions, this distinction is relevant for the speech therapist, as their intervention relies precisely on control acts. From the conversational point of view, control acts are useful for triggering rectification exchanges and, in general, dialogic management metacommunicative behaviours. In this sense, and within what we are calling control acts, Carolyn Letts (1985)<sup>10</sup> distinguishes two basic speech acts in speech therapists' activity:

#### 1. Organisers:

- 1.1. start activities (limiting and guiding markers: “bueno”, “bien”, “a ver”, “qué iba a decir yo”).
- 1.2. ensure the activity flows smoothly: attention grabbers (“oye”, “mira una cosa”), behaviour modifiers (“espera, no te levantes aún”), testers of understanding (“¿no?”, “¿de acuerdo?”, “¿lo entiendes?”), repetition requests (“¿perdona?”, “¿me lo repites?”)

<sup>10</sup> Letts, Carolyn (1985): “Linguistic interaction in the clinic. How do therapists do therapy?”, *Child Language Teaching and Therapy* 1(3), 321-331.

## 2. Continuers:

- 2.1. trigger concrete replies: directive acts, questions, signs
- 2.2. agreement check behaviours ("muy bien", "así, eso es")
- 2.3. give general information (glossing, paraphrasing).

Acts of control include *draft acts*, which involve a test or tentative attempt to elicit a certain speech act. The speaker does not gain access to a certain substantive act and goes through a previous itinerary of draft acts that pepper the intervention as though they were a succession of filled pauses (this is precisely one of the behaviours that Crockford and Lesser term *editing behaviours* in their Quantification of Conversational Behaviours protocol, QCB). Along with the speaker's real inability to silence these test acts (that is, to relegate them to the status of hidden utterance) is the issue of keeping the turn while managing to articulate the intervention effectively. As seen in the discussion of beat regulators, repeated movement transmits the sense of activity to the conversational partner and thus avoids interruption.

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The level of speech acts has been studied quite thoroughly in situations of impairment<sup>11</sup>, but the distinction between the enunciative and the propositional dimension has not always been taken into account. Thus, when Soroker et al. (2005) defended the lateralisation of *basic speech acts* in




Fig. 1. The figure depicts in a schematic way the different localization patterns of the four BSAs. The colored areas are those where the negative correlation between the extent of damage (number of involved pixels within the region of interest) and performance level reached statistical significance at the .05 level. *Assertion*: left inferior frontal gyrus ( $r = .53, p = .02$ ); *Question*: left inferior frontal gyrus ( $r = .57, p = .006$ ) and middle frontal gyrus ( $r = .56, p = .008$ ); *Request*: left inferior frontal gyrus ( $r = .64, p = .0009$ ) and middle frontal gyrus ( $r = .53, p = .009$ ) plus superior temporal gyrus ( $r = .58, p = .004$ ) and middle temporal gyrus ( $r = .55, p = .006$ ); *Command*: left superior temporal gyrus ( $r = .53, p = .01$ ) and middle temporal gyrus ( $r = .57, p = .006$ ) plus the supramarginal gyrus ( $r = .52, p = .01$ ) and angular gyrus ( $r = .57, p = .005$ ). In the right hemisphere (not shown) only one correlation reached significance: *requests* correlating negatively with lesion extent in the right middle frontal gyrus ( $r = .57, p = .01$ ).

the left hemisphere, they were defending the reality of the locutional and propositional production of illocutional speech acts, that is, to their grammatical dimension. Basic Speech Acts (BSA) are those that are indispensable for any competent speaker, and that also sustain the effective production of others: affirmation, question, request and order. The starting-point in their study is the finding that:

*"Both left and right cerebral damage produced significant impairments relative to normal controls, and left brain damaged patients performed worse than patients with right-sided lesions. This finding argues against the common conjecture that the right hemisphere of most right-handers plays a dominant role in natural language pragmatics"* (2005: 214).

This statement forgets that pragmatics uses speech acts based on grammar. Although speakers with left-hemisphere injury fail to realise these acts verbally (in their "grammatical" dimension: locutionary,

propositional, enunciative) they can in fact realise them by means of gestural and prosodic codes; it is therefore possible to say that illocutiveness is preserved despite the left hemisphere lesion.

<sup>11</sup> Soroker Nachum; Kasher, Asa; Giora, Rachel; Batori, Gila; Corn, Cecilia; Gil, Mali / Zaidel, Eran (2005): "[Processing of basic speech acts following localized brain damage: A new light in the neuroanatomy of language](#)", *Brain and Cognition*, 57, pp. 214-217.

The study by Soroker et al. (2005) defends a direct association between certain left-hemisphere (LH) locations (those of BSA), arguing that the right hemisphere (RH) only takes part occasionally in some cases of requests. It should be pointed out, however, that they are not strictly speaking about illocutiveness (of pragmatics) but about the morphosyntaxis and semantics required to carry out this communicative intent. As no item of those used is described, we cannot know exactly what relevance the results have.

In any case, the final statement that “*there is systematic localization of BSAs in the LH but not in the RH*” should be taken in a relative sense, to the extent that the items assessed (basic illocutionary acts) depend on semantics and morphosyntaxis for their execution, together with the fact that the speakers assessed use the grammar of a specific language. The methodological description for the study does not say explicitly<sup>12</sup>, but we can deduce that it deals with Hebrew speakers because it is stated that the subjects (21 with right hemisphere injury and 31 with left hemisphere injury) were assessed using Hebrew versions of the Western Battery (Kertesz) and of the Grammatical Comprehension Test (Curtiss). These are, then, speakers of a non-tonal, fusing language, with a word order that is not particularly markedly Verb-Subject-Object but quite flexible, and in which there is a notable use of triliteral roots typical of Semitic languages, using concatenated morphemes (added) but also with segmental changes (a change of vowels in some verbal forms can lead to morphological change). It can be said that the brains of speakers of tonal languages (both isolating and fusing, that is with lexical or morphological use of the tonal change) can show other uses of their respective hemispheres...

\* \* \* \*

In short, when analysing the enunciative dimension of speech acts in data from impaired speakers, we will be analysing the following categories:

- **PROPOSITIONAL ACTS [AP]:** that is, those acts that possess a semantic load based on the lexicon of the language and thus informatively progress the conversation; of course, this lexicon can be impaired, with symptoms such as agrammatism or paragrammatism, but it responds to the habitual use of natural languages. This type of speech act sometimes involves a minimal semantic content, which approaches the category that Tomoeda and Bayles (1993)<sup>13</sup> identify as “information units” for the speech of subjects with Alzheimer.
- **INFERENCE ACTIVATING ACTS:** these types of speech act are particularly frequent in motor aphasia, but they also appear in dementias, as the speaker uses them to exploit the inferential ability of their conversational partner and achieves a collaborative construction of the interaction. They are frequently monolexemic, present lengthenings and suspended intonation and are usually accompanied by illustrators or regulators;
  - **INTERJECTION [Int.]:** these are exclamations that can have a variable lexicalised semantic content; as we know, the interjection is pragmatically

<sup>12</sup> This use a generalist discourse that does not give relevance to the features commented upon here: nor to the necessary use of grammar for pragmatic ends, nor to its subjects' specific language. These authors, from Tel-Aviv University, are used to working with English and/or Hebrew speakers (their interesting *Pragmatic Battery*, from 1999, prepares it in both languages; they have also adapted the *RHCB: Right Hemisphere Communication Battery*, by Howard Gardner and Hiram H. Brownell, 1986, into Hebrew), and so this simplification is rather surprising.

<sup>13</sup> Tomoeda C.K., Bayles K.A. (1993). Longitudinal effects of Alzheimer's disease on discourse production. *Alzheimer Disease and Associated Disorders* 4: 223-236.

characterised by its "absence of conceptual value"<sup>14</sup> and by the complete absorption of the utterance by the utterance act. In this sense, the interjection emerges as a "joker" morphosyntactic category, able to adopt any propositional value assigned to it by contextual interpretation. This flexibility makes it the ideal template, as any language element can serve as support for the interjection; this means it can also be characterised (Vázquez 2003)<sup>15</sup> as a *non-descriptive lexical unit* with a connecting function.

- **LOCUTIONARY ACTS [AL]**<sup>16</sup>: these are filling utterances, very similar to filled pauses, with which the speaker materialises their turn without really saying anything in grammatical terms. These speech acts can be understood as a separation of the locutionary and propositional dimensions of the speech act, so there is a locution but no real semantic or informative content can be extracted from it. Discursive markers and pronouns with this function are frequently used, together with a lengthened pronunciation (*yooo...*, *éeel...*, *pueees...*).
- **EDITING TASKS**: this concept is adapted to Catherine Crockford and Ruth Lesser's suggestions in their *Quantification of Conversational Behaviours* protocol, although with some slight variations. On other occasions we have described these behaviours comparing them to the tasks involved in film editing, in which the editor discards false takes and puts together the ones that make up the final version. There are various behaviours with this function:
  - **FILLED PAUSES [PO]**: we quantify the vocalisations with which the speaker fills silence so as not to lose their turn while they plan their intervention<sup>17</sup>; our transcription conventions use the standard convention of marking these paralinguistic prolongations with a maximum of three vowels (uum, eeh), so we do not take the real length of this vocalisation into account. Filled pauses were identified in everyday speech by Maclay and Osgood (1959)<sup>18</sup>, as a sign that the speaker does not want to give up the turn and is simply searching for the appropriate words; with these utterances the listener would understand that the speaker has not yet finished and would therefore not interrupt them. This is the value of the PROLONGATORS identified by Jefferson and referred to by Coulthard as *incompletion markers*. But many interruptions in everyday conversation are made precisely by taking advantage of the other person's filled pause, and some psychologists have questioned Maclay and Osgood's interpretations. Thus, M. Cook and M. Lalljee (1970)<sup>19</sup> did some experiments that appeared to contradict the hypothesis that listeners interpret the filled pause as an unfinished turn. Years later, Ball (1975)<sup>20</sup> picked up the issue once again and demonstrated that the experiments carried out by Cook and Lalljee<sup>21</sup> were not comparable

<sup>14</sup> López-García Ángel (1989): *Fundamentos de lingüística perceptiva*. Madrid: Gredos.

<sup>15</sup> Vázquez-Veiga, Nancy (2003): *Marcadores discursivos de recepción*, Santiago de Compostela: Universidade.

<sup>16</sup> We prefer the term "locutionary" to "enunciative" as it better reflects the "loquens" ability.

<sup>17</sup> Jaffe J., Feldstein S. (1970): *Rhythms of Dialogue*. New York, Academic Press.

<sup>18</sup> Maclay, Howard and Osgood, Charles E. (1959): "Hesitation phenomena in spontaneous English speech", *Word*, 15, 19-44.

<sup>19</sup> COOK, Mark and LALLJEE, Mansur G. (1970): "The interpretation of pauses by the listener", *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 9, pp.375-377.

<sup>20</sup> Ball, Peter (1975): "Listener responses to filled pauses in relation to floor apportionment", *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 14, pp.423-425.

<sup>21</sup> In the first, subjects heard a speaker and they were asked to indicate, by pressing a button, when they thought the speaker had finished speaking. They were given eight short utterances, of the type *I have left my books in the library*, with four versions of each one: complete, incomplete, complete with filled pause,

to what happens in spontaneous dialogue. Basically, it does not seem feasible that any listener would really want to interrupt a recorded voice, particularly if the topic was not of their own choosing (Beattie, 1977)<sup>22</sup>.

- **EMPTY PAUSES AT LEAST TWO SECONDS LONG [PV]**; ethnomethodologists identified the 1 second pause as the standard length of the pause within the turn<sup>23</sup>. Crockford and Lesser proposed including pauses of over 2 seconds in editing tasks, and this is the criterion we have adopted.
- **DRAFT ACTS [AB]**: this includes expressions uttered by the speaker in their efforts to run through a lexical series in order to find the lexical element they are searching for, together with the failed attempts to find a particular word or expression, the circumlocutions that reveal lexical access problems, or specific questions on denomination; they are tests, failed attempts, tentative expressions. The example shows intervention 0052, where we classify as a "draft act" the series of numbers until the target-number is found.
- **TAG QUESTIONS [PC]**: we include these in editing tasks as they are an instrument used by the aphasic speaker to verify their conversational partner's understanding, insofar as they give a possible place for interruption (Transition Relevance Place, TRP).
- This leads to cases of motor aphasia in which this type of question is over-used: *¿no?, ¿eh?*

In non-aphasic conversation, tag questions typically occupy the linking position in relation to later interventions (position 3 in the ideal intervention structure)<sup>24</sup>; however, in aphasic conversations these interrogative utterances are not a real handover of the conversational turn, on the contrary, they are used as a turn-keeping strategy.

- **NON-VERBAL ACTS**: the transcription attempts to reflect the gestures used by the speaker at three basic levels: emblems, illustrators and regulators, adopting the basic classification of non-verbal behaviours put forward by Eckman and Friesen<sup>25</sup>. This information is essential in speakers with motor aphasias, as the gesture quite frequently accompanies and supports speech, sometimes substituting it completely. We code as [NV] non-verbal speech acts considered pertinent to the transcription.

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incomplete with filled pause (making a total of 32 utterances). In the second experiment they worked with 120 students divided into four groups. They listened to lists of numbers read by a same speaker, that ended unexpectedly and they were asked to say which was the last number before the speaker announced that they had finished. The material consisted in lists of random numbers: five long lists and three short. Four different versions were prepared of the five long lists: in one the word "stop" was added after the last number; in another two one-and-a-half second pauses were inserted; in the other two a filled pause was added at the beginning and at the end of the one-and-a-half second pauses.

<sup>22</sup> Beattie, Geoffrey W. (1977): "The dynamics of interruption and the filled pause", *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 16.

<sup>23</sup> Jefferson, Gail (1989): "Preliminary Notes on a Possible Metric which Provides for a Standard Maximum Silence of Approximately One Second in Conversation", in Roger D. and Bull P., eds: (1989): *Conversation: an interdisciplinary perspective*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters; p. 166-196.

Gallardo Paúls, Beatriz (1993): "La transición entre turnos conversacionales: silencios, interrupciones y solapamientos", *Contextos* XI/21-22: 189-220.

<sup>24</sup> Dubois B, Crouch I. (1975): The question of tag questions in women's speech: they don't really use more of them, do they? *Language in Society* 4: 289-294.

Davidson, Judy (1984): "Subsequent versions of invitations, offers, requests and proposals dealing with potential or actual rejection", en Atkinson J.M. and Heritage J., eds. *Structures of Social Action*, Cambridge: University Press. p. 102-128.

<sup>25</sup> Eckman P, Friesen W. V. (1969): The repertoire of nonverbal behaviour: categories, origins, usage and codings. *Semiotica* 6: 238-252.

0049	E:	¿y desde cuándo han venido a- a esta casa/ Antonio?/ ¿hace mucho/ que están a- aquí?	
0050	I:	no↓ no↓/ sí↓ sí↓ (ASENTIMIENTO) sí- ssí (⇒E)	<b>AB+AP+NV+AP+NV</b>
0051	M:	¿cuántos años/ aquí? (ILTR DE 'AQUÍ' CON EL DEDO ÍNDICE ↓)	
0052	I:	(⇒ HACIA ABAJO) ¡uuf!/ °(ayy)°/ (CONCENTRADO, CUENTA CON LOS DEDOS) uno/ dos/ tres/ cuatro cinco seis siete ocho nueve diez once doce→/// (M HACE UN RGL DE FRENO; ⇒M) °(¿doce?)°	<b>NV+Int+Int+NV+AB +NV+ AP</b>
0053	M:	(ASENTIMIENTO) °(doce)°	
0054	I:	(⇒ M, ASENTIMIENTO) ¿doce?	<b>NV+NV+AP</b>
0055	M:	doce// va a hacer <b>tre ce</b> // doce que estamos aquí (ILTR DE 'AQUÍ' CON EL DEDO ÍNDICE)	
0056	I:	°(c(l)aro/ [c(l)aro]°)	<b>AP</b>
0057	M:	[en esta] casa (ILTR DE 'AQUÍ' CON EL DEDO ÍNDICE ↓R)	
0058	I:	¡ah!/ sí/ °(sí)°	<b>Int+AP</b>